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THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
LOVE IT OR HATE IT, U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATION NEEDS IT
ANN GRAHAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
A S the United States economy begins a tentative recovery from reces-sion,' Congress is debating financial regulatory reform legislation.2
Whether a stand-alone consumer financial protection agency becomes a
centerpiece of the new regulatory regime or a throw-away bargaining chip
remains to be seen.3 In any assessment of the subprime-mortgage-crisis-
gone-global, with the benefit of hindsight, failures of consumer protection
loom large.4
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. Special thanks to
members of the Villanova Law Review and Professor Jennifer O'Hare, as well as
Elizabeth Brown, Eric Pan, Joan MacLeod Heminway, and Harvey Goldschmid.
Thanks also to AALS colleagues Art Wilmarth, Patricia McCoy, Heidi Schooner,
Kathleen Keest, Elizabcth Schiltz, and Christopher Peterson.
1. See Federal Reserve Board, The Beige Book, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.federal
reserve.gov/FOMC/BeigeBook/2010/20100113/default.htm.
2. See The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R.
4173, 111th Cong. (2009) (passed by U.S. House of Representatives on Dec. 11,
2009, and awaiting Senate passage of financial reform legislation); see generally
Stacy Kaper, Obstacle Course Awaits Senate Reg Reform Bill, Am. BANKER, Jan. 4, 2010,
http://www.financial-planning.com/news/Reform-Dodd-Senate-FDIC- 26 6 5 26 4 -1.
html ("Passing a regulatory reform bill through the House was a bruising, months-
long fight that appeared ready to spin out of control. That battle may pale in
comparison to the legislation's progress through the Senate.").
3. See Damian Paletta, Consumer Protection Agency in Doubt: Dodd Weighs Dropping
Idea of Creating Independent Body in Bid to Get Financial Regulatory Revamp Passed This
Year, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240 5 274 8
704363504575003360632239020.html.
4. See Letter from Professors of Consumer Law and Banking Law, American
Law Schools, to ChristopherJ. Dodd, Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate; Richard C. Shelby, Ranking Member, Comm. on Bank-
ing, Hous., and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate; Barney Frank, Chairman, Fin. Servs.
Comm., U.S. House of Rep.; and Spencer Bachus, Ranking Member, Fin. Servs.
Comm., U.S. House of Rep. (Sept. 29, 2009), http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Media/
consumer-law%209-28-09.pdf. This letter, titled a Statement in Suppord ofLegislation
Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, was joined by more than eighty
professors who teach courses related to consumer and banking law at American
law schools. Id. The letter listed twenty-one scholarly articles "critical of regulatory
rulemaking and decisional outcomes in the area of consumer financial products"
as background for the proposition that
regulatory approaches at the existing agencies, whose jurisdiction in-
cludes but does not focus on consumer financial products . . . place a
higher value on protecting the interest of financial product vendors who
promote complex debt instruments using aggressive sales practices, than
they do on protecting the interests of consumers in transparent, safe, and
fair financial products.
(603)
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In the wake of this crisis, just as in the aftermath of the banking col-
lapse of the 1930s, Congress has an opportunity to restructure a broken
financial regulatory system. More than band-aids are required. If the re-
forms Congress now adopts are to secure a lengthy period of financial
stability, as was the case following the New Deal era's re-envisioning of
financial regulation,5 consumer protection cannot continue to be
marginalized. Congress has an opportunity to demonstrate leadership as
it considers the creation of a new, independent agency whose sole mission
is to protect consumers of financial products from the abuses which con-
tributed to the present financial crisis. The prospect of such a major shift
in the allocation of regulatory authority sets the stage for heated debate
between consumer protection advocates and beneficiaries of the status
quo in both the federal regulatory agencies and the financial services
industry.6
On June 17, 2009, President Barack Obama's administration an-
nounced a plan to overhaul U.S. financial regulation.7 The White Paper,
Financial Regulatory Reform-A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Services,8
was quickly followed by an administration-supported bill, The Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2009,9 filed in the House of Representatives on
July 9, 2009, by House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA)
and twelve other sponsors.' 0 Based on economic suffering and political
outrage from "Main Street" directed at "Wall Street" for causing the finan-
cial crisis, the Obama administration and Committee Chairman Frank an-
Id.
5. See generally RicHARD ScoTrr CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MAcEY & GEOFFREY P.
MILLER, THE LAw OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONs 20 (4th ed. 2009)(describing "Years of Stability: 1934-1980").
6. See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Chutzpah on Steroids, N.Y. TIMES, at A25, July 13,
2009; see also Elizabeth Warren, Editorial, Wall Street's Race to the Bottom, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703630404575053
514188773400.html?mod=rssToday'sMost Popular.
7. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President
Obama To Announce Comprehensive Plan for Regulatory Reform (June 17,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/President-Obama-
to-Announce-Comprehensive-Plan-for-Regulatory-Reform/.
8. See Dept. of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform-A New Foundation:
Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation, http://www.financialstability.gov/
docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf [hereinafter White Paper on Financial Regulatory
Refo-n].
9. H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (2009), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/
financialsvcs-dem/21frank_011_xml.pdf; see also Press Release, House Financial
Services Committee, Frank Introduces Obama Administration's Plan to Increase
Consumer Protection (July 9, 2009), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/
press/financialsvcs~dem/press_070809.shtml.
10. The other twelve sponsors of the bill were Representatives Maxine Waters(D-CA), Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), Luis Gutierrez (D-IL), Mel Watt (D-NC), Gary
Ackerman (D-NY), Brad Sherman (D-CA), Michael Capuano (D-MA), Brad Miller
(D-NC), Al Green (D-TX), Keith Ellison (D-MN), Jackie Speier (D-CA), and Alan
Grayson (D-FL).
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ticipated prompt passage of regulatory reform legislation." Throughout
the fall of 2009, however, the House wrangled over financial regulatory
reform legislation. On December 11, 2009, the House passed The Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,12 by a vote of 223 to 202,
demonstrating a sharply partisan Democrat/Republican divide. The Con-
sumer Financial Protection Agency Act is Title IV of the Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act.13
This Article analyzes The Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act
of 2009, as passed by the House of Representatives. Each Section of this
Article identifies a key point of controversy, with arguments pro and con,
coming down in favor of an independent consumer financial protection
agency. In conclusion, a final Section summarizes political realities, in-
cluding a 2010 U.S. Supreme Court case affecting campaign finance,
which will impact prospects for a consumer financial protection agency
(CFPA).
II. A CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGENCY- STRUCTURE, SCOPE OF
AUTHORTIY, ROLE OF THE STATES, AND ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
IN CONSUMER PROTECTION
As originally envisioned in the Obama administration's White Pa-
per,14 the CFPA would be a new, independent federal agency, with stable
funding, broad jurisdiction, and sole rulemaking authority for all con-
sumer financial protection statutes. The new agency would have supervi-
sory and enforcement authority over all entities, regardless of charter, that
are covered by existing and future consumer financial statutes. The
agency's mission would be to: protect consumers of financial products and
services, regulate unregulated financial institutions, centralize consumer
financial protection, minimize inconsistencies in regulation, and address
11. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2002). By
comparison, following the Enron accounting scandal resulting in Chapter 11 filing
on Dec. 2, 2001, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in short order.
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law what he called "the most far-
reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt." George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, in 38
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1283, 1284 (Aug. 5, 2002), http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdoclD=284337166365+1+1+0&WAISaction=
retrieve. At that time, Congress promptly took a hard line against corporate
abuses that the current Congress has yet to match. In his signing statement, Presi-
dent Bush went on to say, "This new law sends very clear messages that all con-
cemed must heed. This law says to every dishonest corporate leader: 'You will be
exposed and punished. The era of low standards and false profits is over. No
boardroom in America is above or beyond the law.'" Id.
12. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009), http://docs.house.gov/rules/finserv/
111_hrfinsrv.pdf; see also Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House,
Pelosi: Wall Street Reform Bill Will Protect Main Street from the Worst of Wall
Street (Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/press
releases?id=1471.
13. See H.R. 4173.
14. See White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform, supra note 8.
605
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the reality that consumer protection issues have been slighted by agencies
with other responsibilities, such as the safety and soundness and profitabil-
ity of insured depository institutions.
Opinions about the agency were sharply divided from the outset.15
Controversial issues discussed in this Article include: (1) Is it necessary to
establish a new federal agency for consumer financial protection or can
consumer protection be assured through the existing federal financial reg-
ulators? (2) Can consumer protection compliance be separated from
"safety-and-soundness" regulation? (3) What entities should be subject to
the authority of a consumer financial protection regime? (4) Should a
new consumer financial protection agency have centralized rulemaking
authority for existing and future consumer protection laws? (5) What ex-
amination and enforcement authority should a new consumer financial
protection agency have and how should that authority be coordinated with
other regulators? (6) Should a consumer financial protection agency have
a single head or be governed by a multi-member board? (7) How can the
new consumer financial protection agency be staffed? (8) What funding
structure is optimal?
Other key issues deal with the philosophy of government regulation
of financial institutions: (9) Should financial institutions be required to
offer "plain vanilla" financial products? (10) Will a new consumer finan-
cial protection agency result in more government regulation, stifle "inno-
vation," and increase the cost of financial products and services?
The role of States in consumer financial protection occupies much of
the debate: (11) Can States retain concurrent authority over consumer
15. See, e.g., Addressing the Need for Comprehensive Regulatory Reform: Hearing
Before the H. Fin. Seros. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009); Banking Industry Perspectives on
the Obama Administration's Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H.
Fin. Sevs. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009); Community and Consumer Advocates' Perspec-
tives on the Obama Administration's Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before
the H. Fin. Sers. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009); Federal and State Enforcement of Finan-
cial Consumer and Investor Protection Laws: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Sews. Comm.,111th Cong. (2009); Federal Regulator Perspectives on Financial Regulatory Reform: Hear-
ng Before the H. Fin. Sers. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009); H.R 1728, the Mortgage Re-
form and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2009: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Sews. Comm.,
111th Cong. (2009); Industry Perspectives on the Obama Administration's Financial Reg-
ulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Sers. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009);
Perspectives on the Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Sers.
Comm., 111th Cong. (2009); Regulatory Perspectives on the Obama Administration's Fi-
nancial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Sers. Comm., 111th
Cong. (2009); Regulatory Restructuring: Safeguarding Consumer Protection and the Role
of the Federal Reserve: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Sers. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009); The
Administration's Plan for the Restructuring of the American Financial Regulatory System:
Hearing Before the H. Fin. Sers. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009); The Administration's Pro-
posals for Financial Regulatory Reform: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 111th
Cong. (2009). The myriad of titles of the hearings indicates the diversity of views
expressed. All hearings are available at http://financialservices.house.gov/
hearings.all.shtml.
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financial protection and, if so, what is the appropriate measure of federal
preemption in the financial institutions arena?
A. Is It Necessary to Establish a New Federal Agency for Consumer Financial
Protection or Can Consumer Protection Be Assured through
Existing Federal Financial Regulators?
Cogent reasons exist for establishing a new federal agency for con-
sumer financial protection rather than relying on existing federal financial
regulators. First, the subprime mortgage meltdown, which led to national
and global economic crisis, was caused in large part by consumer protec-
tion failures. Consumer abuses were rampant. "Teaser rate" loans were
re-priced to become unaffordable.16 Predatory loan terms and practices-
including loan flipping, fee packing, equity stripping, and steering low in-
come and minority borrowers to expensive, unsuitable mortgage loan
products-had become standard.17 U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner has identified "pervasive failures in consumer protection, leaving
many Americans with obligations they did not understand and could not
sustain,"' 8 as a primary cause of "the most severe global financial crisis in
generations."19 Geithner testified before the House Financial Services
Committee that "weaknesses in our consumer and investor protections
harm individuals, undermine trust in our financial system, and can con-
tribute to systemic crises that shake the very foundations of our financial
system."20 According to Nobel Laureate Dr. Joseph Stiglitz, "[I]t was the
subprime mortgages, irresponsible loans made to uninformed individuals
beyond their ability to pay, designed to generate bankers fees as they
robbed the poor of their life savings, that began the unraveling of our
financial system." 2'
16. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REv. 963,
970 (2009) (explaining problem of "teaser rate" loans).
17. See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall
Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2039, 2043 (2007) (defining
predatory lending as syndrome of loan abuses); see also Edward M. Gramlich, Gov-
ernor, Fed. Reserve Brd., An Update on the Predatory Lending Issue, Remarks at
the Texas Ass'n of Bank Counsel 27th Annual Convention (Oct. 9, 2003), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20031009/default.htm
(describing characteristics of predatory lending and subprime lending).
18. Addressing the Need for Comprehensive Regulatory Reform: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Sen's., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Timothy F. Geithner,
Secretary, United States Treasury), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/
financialsvcs_dem/geithner032609.pdf.
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Compensation in the Financial Industry: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 111th Cong. 5-6 (2010) (statement of Dr. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Co-
lumbia University), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs-dem/
stiglitz.pdf.
607
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Second, inadequate disclosures of loan terms and inherently decep-
tive loan products damage not only individual consumers, but also the
entire U.S. mortgage market and national economy. Harvard Law Profes-
sor Elizabeth Warren, Chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel and an
early proponent of an independent consumer financial protection
agency,2 2 explains the need for a consumer financial protection agency in
five words: "The Credit Market Is Broken." 23 Warren says, "The broken
credit market caused the current crisis, is perpetuating the crisis, and will
cause future crises-unless we fix it."2 4 One of the most basic failures of
the credit market, which could be remedied by an effective consumer fi-
nancial protection agency, results from the fact that financial products are
designed to preclude meaningful comparison and consumer choice. Dis-
closures in incomprehensible terminology and fine print lure consumers
to succumb to "tricks and traps."2 5 The lack of understandable credit
term disclosures harms both individual consumers and our economy as a
whole. Beyond inflicting economic damage on individual borrowers, de-
ceptive terms in financial products negatively impact the operation of the
free market system. Dr. Stiglitz, a strong proponent of a "financial prod-
ucts safety commission," points out that markets fail to produce efficient
outcomes when information is imperfect or asymmetric.2 6 In his view, an
independent consumer financial protection agency should require trans-
parency in financial products, regulate incentives, and curb risky and ex-
ploitive practices.2 7
The third and most persuasive argument for a new, independent con-
sumer financial protection agency is that the existing federal agencies
22. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY J. OF IDEAS
8 (2007), http://www.democracyjoumal.org/article.php?ID=6528. Warren notes
that:
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of bursting
into flames and burning down your house. But it is possible to refinance
an existing home with a mortgage that has the same one-in-five chance of
putting the family out on the street-and the mortgage won't even carry
a disclosure of that fact to the homeowner.
Id. at 8.
23. See YouTube: Elizabeth Warren on Proposed CFPA (Consumer Financial
Protection Agency), AmericanNewsProject (June 17, 2009), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=i60aHGPEn94; YouTube: Professor Elizabeth Warren Speaks about
the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, American4FinanReform (July 17,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?vlYd8e5Cjvs. In an effort to address the
arguments for the CFPA to a broad audience, Professor Warren's YouTube videos
explain the need for better consumer financial protection.
24. YouTube: Professor Elizabeth Warren Speaks about the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Agency, supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. See The Future of Financial Services Regulation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Serts., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Dr. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Co-
lumbia University), http://financialservices.house.gov/hearingl10/hrl02108.
shtml.
27. Id.
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have failed to protect consumers.2 8 Allowing responsibility for consumer
protection to remain where it currently resides and providing no materi-
ally different structure to assure consumer protection in the future is un-
acceptable to consumer protection advocates, including Committee
Chairman Frank, who says:
No one familiar with the track record of the bank regulatory
agencies with respect to protecting consumers can deny the need
for an independent agency if we are going to have effective con-
sumer protection. Bank regulators have traditionally treated
their responsibilities for consumer protection as a second
priority.2 9
The existing federal financial institution regulators, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC), view their primary responsibility as protecting
the "safety and soundness" and profitability of their supervised institu-
tions-an objective that can and often does conflict with consumer protec-
tion.3  Agency funding comes from fees and assessments on the entities
supervised,3 ' resulting in marketing charters on the basis of ability to
avoid state consumer protection laws. 32 Agencies that possessed the legal
28. See Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regula-
tion: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Sers., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of
Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America, and Ed-
mund Mierzwinski, Director, Consumer Program, U.S. PIRG), http://www.house.
gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs dem/mierzwinski -_submittedwith_
plunkett.pdf (detailing specific agency failures to address consumer protection).
29. See Press Release, House Financial Services Committee, Frank Statement
on Consumer Protection (Feb. 9, 2010), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/
list/press/financialsvcs dem/pressCFPA_02092010.shtml.
30. See Regulatory Restructuring: Safeguarding Consumer Protection and the Role of
the Federal Reserve: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy and Tech. of
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 18-20 (2009) (statement of Patricia A.
McCoy, Director, Insurance Law Center, University of Connecticut), http://www.
house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcsdem/mccoy-house-testimony-
hearing-july1 6_2009.pdf.
31. See, e.g., Credit Card Practices: Current Consumer & Regulatory Issues: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Seros.,
110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Professor of Law,
George Washington University Law School), http://financialservices.house.gov/
hearingl10/htwilmarthO42607.pdf. For example,
More than 95% of the OCC's budget is financed by assessments paid by
national banks, and the twenty biggest national banks account for nearly
three-fifths of those assessments .... Thus, the OCC has a powerful finan-
cial interest in pleasing its largest regulated constituents, and the OCC
therefore faces a clear conflict of interest whenever it considers the possi-
bility of taking an enforcement action against a major national bank.
Id. at 16.
32. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Comptrol-
ler Calls Preemption a Major Advantage of National Bank Charter (Feb. 12, 2002),
available at http://www.occ.gov/speeches.htm. For examples of how the OCC
609
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authority to curb abusive lending practices stalled the rulemaking process
even as Congress pressed for action.3 3
Leading consumer advocacy groups favoring the establishment of an
independent consumer financial protection agency include: Consumer
Federation of America, U.S. PIRG, ACORN, Americans for Fairness in
Lending, Consumer Action, Center for Digital Democracy, Consumers
Union, Demos, National Association of Consumer Advocates, National
Consumer Law Center, National Fair Housing Alliance, National People's
Action, Public Citizen, and Center for Responsible Lending.3 4
The existing federal financial institution regulators acknowledge fail-
ures of consumer protection, but oppose key aspects of the Administra-
tion's proposal for an independent consumer financial protection agency.
The regulators principally oppose: allowing States to set more stringent
standards than those set by the CFPA, granting the CFPA examination au-
thority over banks and thrifts, and separating consumer protection from
prudential regulation.35
Financial services industry trade groups vigorously oppose the crea-
tion of a new, independent consumer financial protection agency.3 6 In-
used federal preemption to shield national banks from state consumer protection
laws, see Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009); Watters v. Wacho-
via Bank, 550 U.S. 1 (2007); and Wells Fargo v. James, 321 F.3d 488 (5th Cir.
2003), which are discussed more fully at Section D, infta.
33. For example, despite a series of hearings during the summer of 2006, it
was not until January 2008 that the Federal Reserve Board belatedly exercised its
authority to propose consumer protection amendments to the Regulation Z, which
implements the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the Home Owners Equity Pro-
tection Act (HOEPA). The Federal Reserve's Final Rule issued July 30, 2008, and
is partially effective Oct. 1, 2009, and partially effective April 1, 2010. See 73 Fed.
Reg. 44522 (July 30, 2008) (providing background for Final Rule); Press Release,
Federal Reserve Board (May 3, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/20070503a.htm (describing four public hearings con-
ducted during summer of 2006 and additional public hearing during summer of
2007). Despite public outcry and the collapse of the subprime mortgage market,
the Federal Reserve delayed this basic consumer protection action for more than
four years. See Press Release, House Financial Services Committee, The Federal
Reserve's Record on Consumer Protection (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://
www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs dem/pressfrr_092309.shtml (pro-
viding "a report card demonstrating the poor record of the Federal Reserve in
using the tools provided by Congress to protect consumers from abusive financial
industry practices").
34. See Statements of Plunkett and Mierzwinski, supra note 28 (identifying
principal consumer organizations and providing well-researched analysis of issues
surrounding consumer financial protection agency proposal).
35. See generally Regulatory Perspectives on the Obama Administration's Financial
Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serws., 111th Cong.
(2009) (statements of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Com-
pany; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board; John E. Bowman, Act-
ing Director, Office of Thrift Supervision; and John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the
Currency, Office of Comptroller of the Currency), http://www.house.gov/apps/
list/hearing/financialscs dem/hrfc_072409.shtml.
36. See Press Release, Financial Services Roundtable, Roundtable Opposes
Consumer Financial Protection Agency (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.fs
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dustry trade groups that have been particularly vocal in opposing the
creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency include: Ameri-
can Bankers Association, Financial Services Roundtable, and Independent
Community Bankers of America. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has
also opposed the CFPA.3 7 Financial institutions fighting establishment of
a CFPA charge that creating a new, independent agency with primary ju-
risdiction over consumer financial protection would: increase regulatory
burden, inappropriately separate consumer protection from prudential
regulation, stifle innovation, unfairly burden small financial institutions,
destroy uniformity of regulation by allowing States to impose higher con-
sumer financial protection standards, and increase the cost of financial
products and services to consumers.3 8 Financial industry lobbyists have
mobilized substantial resources in opposition to the CFPA.3 9 A significant
number of small business groups, on the other hand, support the FCPA.40
B. Can Consumer Protection Compliance Be Separated from
"Safety-and-Soundness" Regulation?
A key concern is whether consumer financial protection regulation
can or should be compartmentalized. Prudential regulation, which em-
phasizes financial solvency, must take account of the consumer protection
performance of a financial institution to assure long-term viability. Safety-
and-soundness and consumer protection have long been regarded by the
best bank regulators as complementary rather than contradictory.
round.org/media/htm09/roundtable-opposes-consumer-financial-protection
agency.html; see also Perspectives on the Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (statements of R. Michael S.
Menzies, Sr., on behalf of the Independent Community Bankers of America, and
Edward L. Yingling, President and Chief Executive Officer, American Bankers As-
sociation) (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financial
svcs-dem/hr 092309.shtml.
37. See Perspectives on the Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Andrew J. Pincus, on
behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) http://www.house.gov/apps/list/
hearing/financialsvcs dem/pincus -schamber.pdf.
38. See supra notes 36 and 37. But see Statements of Plunkett and Mierzwinski,
supra note 28 (providing rebuttal to arguments against CFPA); see also Elizabeth
Warren, Three Myths about the Consumer Financial Product Agency, THE BASELINE SCE-
NARIO, July 21, 2009, http://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/21/three-myths-
about-the-consumer-financial-product-agency.
39. See Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on Con-
sumer Financial Protection (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Consumer-Financial-
Protection.
40. See Press Release, Business for Shared Prosperity, Business Owners Want
Strong Consumer Financial Protection Agency, Say Senate Should Stop Protecting
Wall Street (Feb. 9, 2010), available at http://www.businessforsharedprosperity.
org/news/Business+Owners+Want+Strong+Consumer+Financial+Protection+
Agency%2C+Say+Senate+Should+Stop+Protecting+Wall+Street.
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The existing federal regulators argue that consumer compliance
should not be separated from prudential regulation.4 1 Without doubt,
consumer protection failures can negatively impact the soundness of a fi-
nancial institution. The subprime mortgage collapse demonstrates that
when financial institutions pursue short-term profits at the expense of con-
sumers, bank failures result. Federal regulators should have been moni-
toring both profitability and consumer abuses. The problem with an
argument to preserve the regulatory status quo is that prudential regula-
tors had the authority and the opportunity to regulate predatory lending
products and tactics at the heart of the subprime debacle, but they failed
to do so until too late. Although each existing federal financial regulatory
agency has a consumer protection division and compliance examination
staff, these departments are overshadowed in terms of resources and re-
spect from the agencies' top management by the safety-and-soundness su-
pervision divisions.
A new consumer financial protection agency would have the advan-
tages of: a single focus on consumer protection, independence from the
industry and the regulators that have slighted consumer protection in the
past, a clear directive to elevate consumer protection, and the require-
ment "to consult with other federal regulators to promote consistency with
prudential, market, and systemic objectives."4 2 A single consumer finan-
cial protection agency would eliminate inconsistencies in regulation
among several federal agencies which have resulted in "charter shopping"
by financial institutions seeking the least restrictive alternative.
C. What Entities Should Be Subject to the Authority of a Consumer
Financial Protection Regime?
One of the principal reasons for establishing a consumer financial
protection agency is to protect consumers of all types of financial products
and services. This represents an effort to regulate unregulated financial
institutions and centralize consumer financial protection so as to mini-
mize inconsistencies in regulation. A positive aspect of the proposal is the
regulation of previously unregulated providers of financial products and
services. This is long overdue. Had all mortgage brokers and lenders
been subject to a level playing field of consumer protection oversight,
many of the abuses leading to the subprime mortgage meltdown might
have been controlled.
41. See Regulatory Perspectives on the Obama Administration's Financial Regulatory
Reform Proposals, supra note 35.
42. White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform, supra note 8, at 59.
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Draft legislation proposed by the Administration 4 3 defined "con-
sumer financial product or service,"44 "financial activity,"4 5 and "covered
person"4 6 broadly, with the intention of conferring jurisdiction over all
companies, regardless of size or charter, that provide financial deposit and
savings products, consumer credit and loan servicing, real estate appraisal
and settlement, collection, check guarantee, consumer report, financial
advisory, financial data processing, money transmitting, stored value, or
other products or services for consumers, as designated by CFPA rule.
The draft legislation granted the CFPA specific authority for sixteen con-
sumer protection statutes, including: Alternative Mortgage Transaction
Parity Act, Community Reinvestment Act, Consumer Leasing Act, Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Fair Credit Bill-
ing Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
certain provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, certain provisions
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing
Act, Truth in Lending Act, and Truth in Savings Act.4 7
Although the initial proposal was to establish a watchdog agency with
jurisdiction over all types of consumer financial products and services of-
fered by any entity engaged in the provision of financial products and ser-
vices to consumers, the industry lobbying and legislative horse-trading
began immediately. In the House-passed bill, H.R. 4173,48 small commu-
nity banks and credit unions, defined as those insured depository institu-
tions with total assets of $10,000,000,000 or less, 49 would continue to be
examined for consumer compliance as well as for safety-and-soundness,
not by the CFPA but by their primary federal regulator. Realtors50 and
auto dealers,5 1 although they are substantially involved in consumer credit
products and services for home and car purchases, would be exempt from
coverage. Credit extended directly by a merchant and debt collection by a
merchant are excluded from the CFPA's jurisdiction.5 2 Entities regulated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)," the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission (CFTC), 54 a state securities regulator,5 5 or a
43. Draft Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 (proposed by
U.S. Treasury Dept. June 30, 2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CFPA-
Act.pdf.
44. Id. § 1002(8).
45. Id. § 1002(18).
46. Id. § 1002(9).
47. See id. § 1002(16) (defining "enumerated consumer laws").
48. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009).
49. See id. § 4203.
50. See id. § 4205(j).
51. See id. § 4205(k)
52. See id. § 4205(a).
53. See id. § 4205(b).
54. See id. § 4205(c).
55. See id. § 4205(d).
613
11
Graham: The Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Love It or Hate It, U.S
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
VILIANOVA LAW REVIEw
state insurance regulator5 6 are also excluded from the CFPA's jurisdiction.
Federal home loan banks57 and farm credit system banks,58 employee ben-
efit plans,5 9 certified public accountants and tax preparers,6 0 lawyers,6 1
pawnbrokers, 62 manufactured home and modular home retailers,6 3 credit
reporting agencies,6 4 and tax exempt charities65 are beyond the reach of
the CFPA. The CFPA would be prohibited from establishing a usury limit
on consumer loans.6 6
The obvious conclusion is that affected industries are lobbying suc-
cessfully to be exempt from consumer protection supervision and account-
ability. The more holes Congress creates in the net, the less effective this
legislation will be for consumers.
D. Three Related Questions: (1) Should a New Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Have Centralized Rulemaking Authority for Existing and Future
Consumer Protection Laws; (2) What Examination and Enforcement Authority
Should a New Consumer Financial Protection Agency Have; and (3) How
Should that Authority Be Coordinated with Other Regulators?
In the current House Bill 4173, the CFPA has been given rulemaking
authority6 7-with the requirement that the new agency must conduct a
cost/benefit analysis, taking into account consumers, regulated entities,
and the Federal Government.68 The new agency is directed to consider
particularly "the potential reduction of consumers' access to consumer fi-
nancial products or services"6 9 that could result from any given regulation.
The CFPA's rulemaking authority can be exercised only after consulting
with the federal banking agencies, State bank supervisors, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), and any other appropriate federal agency, "re-
garding the consistency of a proposed regulation with prudential, con-
sumer protection, civil rights, market, or systemic objectives,"7 0 as well as
whether the proposed regulation may have an inconsistent effect as be-
tween depository institutions and non-depository institutions." In short,
56. See id. § 4205(e).
57. See id. § 4205 (f).
58. See id. § 4 2 05 (g).
59. See id. § 4205(h).
60. See id. § 4205(i).
61. See id. § 4205(n).
62. See id. § 4205(o).
63. See id. § 4205(m).
64. See id. § 4 2 05(p).
65. See id. § 4205(r).
66. See id. § 4205(1).
67. See id. § 4202(b) (1).
68. See id. § 4202(b) (2).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
614 [Vol. 55: p. 603
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss3/3
2010] THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGENCY
the legislation has been "watered down"7 2 so that the CFPA would be
given rulemaking authority in the consumer financial protection arena-
but only in a way that will hamstring its ability to move quickly or
decisively.
If meaningful rulemaking authority for the CFPA is difficult to
achieve, examination authority is even more controversial. The OCC has
been aggressively protective of its "exclusive visitorial powers" over na-
tional banks.73 The current legislation does grant to the CFPA authority
to conduct periodic examinations, "without regard to charter or corporate
form, based on the Director's assessment of the risks posed to consumers
in relevant product markets and geographic markets."74 With this lan-
guage, Congress would overrule the United States Supreme Court's 2007
decision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank,75 holding that operating subsidiaries
of national banks are subject to examination and enforcement only by the
OCC. The Court's 2009 decision in Cuomo v. Clearing House Association76
would also be overturned to the extent of its holding that only the OCC
can examine and request documents from national banks to determine
violations of consumer protection laws.
In conducting supervisory activities, the CFPA would be required to
coordinate with federal and state banking agencies regarding examination
schedules and required reports.7 7 The CFPA is also directed to use re-
ports already prepared for other regulators to the fullest extent possible.78
The CFPA may delegate its examination authority to another regulatory
agency, upon that agency's petition.79 Examination reports are to be
shared, upon reasonable assurances of confidentiality, among the CFPA,
federal agencies, and state agencies having jurisdiction over any covered
entities.8 0 The existing regulatory agencies may concede that the CFPA
could address the "rulewriting gap" but strongly argue that, for insured
depository institutions, implementation (examination and enforcement)
of consumer protection laws should be left to the primary federal banking
72. See Michael Grunwald, The Case for a Consumer Financial Protection Agency,
TiME, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599, 19 6 44 6 9 ,
00.html (describing need for consumer financial protection agency, lobbying ef-
forts to block legislation, and arguments by banking industry and federal banking
agencies that new agency is not needed).
73. See discussion infra, Part II.J. relating to federal preemption.
74. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 4202(c) (2009).
75. See 550 U.S. 1, 41-43 (2007). For more information on this case, see Ann
Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and judicial Review
ofAgency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 229, 250-53 (2008) (discussing majority and
minority opinions as well as fact situation that precipitated case).
76. See 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2720-22 (2009).
77. See H.R. 4173, § 4202(c) (3).
78. See id. § 4202(c)(6).
79. See id. § 4242(c) (11).
80. See id. § 4202(c) (8).
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regulators.81 This would leave only non-depository institutions under the
full authority of the CFPA.
The CFPA would have primary enforcement authority for financial
consumer protection compliance, but must coordinate with the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and other agencies.82 The CFPA's investigation
authority is intended to be conducted in cooperation with agencies having
current authority over covered entities.8 3 The CFPA would be granted the
full panoply of administrative tools for civil investigation and administra-
tive discovery, including subpoena power,84 hearings, and adjudication
proceedings. 8 5 The CFPA may grant administrative relief8 6 in the form of:
rescission or reformation of contracts; refund of moneys or return of real
property; restitution; disgorgement or compensation for unjust enrich-
ment; money damages; public notification regarding the violation; limits
on future activities or functions; civil money penalties up to $1,000,000 per
day, according to a tiered structure correlating to severity of violation; and
recovery of costs, but no exemplary or punitive damages.87 The new
agency would have litigation authority and may even appear before the
Supreme Court to represent itself in its own name upon timely request to
the U.S. Attorney General.88 The pending legislation does not create a
new private right of action for violation of consumer protection laws.89
The CFPA would be authorized to make criminal referrals to the Attorney
General.90
The House-passed legislation creates new whistleblower protection.9 1
Employees of entities under the CFPA's authority may not be terminated
or discriminated against for providing information to the CFPA, for testify-
ing in administrative or enforcement proceedings, or because the em-
ployee "objected to, or refused to participate in, any activity policy,
practice or assigned task that the employee . . . reasonably believed to be
in violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or to be unfair, deceptive, or
abusive and likely to cause specific and substantial injury to one or more
consumers." 92 The hope behind this section is similar to that for the
81. See, e.g., Federal Regulator Perspectives on Federal Regulatory Reform: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Seros., 111th Cong. 10-11 (2009) (statement of John C.
Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Comptroller of the Currency),http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcsdem/dugan 
-- occ(resubmitted).pdf.
82. See H.R. 4173, § 4202(e).
83. See id. § 4502.
84. See id.
85. See id. § 4503.
86. See id. § 4505.
87. See id. § 4505(a) (3).
88. See id. § 4504.
89. See id. § 4508.
90. See id. § 4506.
91. See id. § 4507.
92. See id. § 4 507(a) (2).
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whistleblower section of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: 9 that employees
will step forward to avert the next crisis. Whistleblower protection has, at
best, a mixed record in this regard. 94
H.R. 4173 would create a new Victims Relief Fund, held at Treasury,
into which civil penalties obtained through judicial or administrative ac-
tion by the CFPA shall be deposited. The CFPA would disburse these
funds as restitution to victims. If victims cannot be located, five percent of
the Victims Relief Fund, up to $10,000,000 per year, would be transferred
to the Secretary of the Treasury for the Financial Education and Counsel-
ing Grant Program established under the Housing and Economic Recov-
ery Act of 2008.11
E. Should a Consumer Financial Protection Agency Have a Single Head
or Be Governed by a Multi-Member Board?
Composition of the new CFPA governing structure is a critical area of
debate. One issue is the balance between independence from and cooper-
ation with existing agencies. Another is whether the agency should be led
by one director, who is capable of meeting the chairmen of other financial
agencies with equal standing, or whether a multi-member board with stag-
gered terms can best achieve independence from any one presidential ad-
ministration. In the current legislation (H.R. 4173), governing structure
for the CFPA represents a compromise between House Financial Services
Chairman Frank's view favoring a single director and House Energy and
Commerce Committee Chairman Henry Waxman's push for a multi-mem-
ber commission.9 6
In H.R. 4173, the CFPA would initially be led by a Director,9 7 ap-
pointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate.9 8 On the
"agency conversion date,"9 9 two years after consumer protection functions
of the Federal Reserve, OCC, OTS, FDIC, FTC, NCUA, and HUD are
93. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806(a), 116 Stat. 745, 802 (2002) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1514A).
94. See generally Leonard M. Baynes, just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corpo-
rate Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 875 (2002).
95. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified in scattered Sections
of 12, 15, 26, 37, 38, and 42 U.S.C.).
96. See Silla Brush, Reps. Frank, Waxman Square Off Over New Consumer Agency,
THE Hiu., Oct. 28, 2009, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/65301-frank-
waxman-square-off-over-consumer-agency-; see also, Silla Brush, Frank, Waxman Iron-
ing Out Dfferences Over Financial Regulatory Agency, THE HiLL, Dec. 3, 2009, http://
thehill.com/homenews/house/70495-frank-waxman-ironing-out-differences-over-
consumer-financial-regulatory-agency.
97. See H.R. 4173, § 4101(b).
98. See id. § 4102(b) (2).
99. See id. § 4002(38).
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transferred to the CFPA, 00 the governing structure of the CFPA would
change from a single Director to a five-member Commission.o10 Commis-
sion members would be appointed by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to serve five-year staggered terms. 10 2 Continuity in
the change-over is assured by a provision that the first Chair of the Com-
mission shall be the person serving as Director at that time.' 0 3 Commis-
sion members are required to have "strong competencies and experiences
related to consumer financial protection"10 4 and to engage in no other
employment during their terms. 0 5 Bipartisanship would be fostered by
the staggered terms and by the provision that not more than three Com-
mission members may be of the same political party.106
In addition to the initial Director and the Commission that follows,
there would be a twelve-member Consumer Financial Protection Over-
sight Board. Seven members comprise the heads of the Federal Reserve,
the chartering authority for national banks, the FDIC, the NCUA, the
FTC, HUD, and the liaison committee of State agencies to the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). 0 7 Five additional
members would be appointed by the President, with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, from among experts in the fields of consumer protec-
tion, fair lending and civil rights, and depository institutions who primarily
serve underserved communities or communities that have been signifi-
cantly impacted by higher-priced mortgage loans.' 0 8 The Oversight Board
would have only advisory authority, providing information about the con-
sistency of consumer financial protection regulations with prudential,
market, or systemic objectives.10 9
The CFPA would not lack for advice and counsel. In addition to the
Oversight Board, the CFPA would appoint a Consumer Advisory Board,"10
not more than half of whose members may be of the same political party.
The CFPA would also coordinate with the SEC, the CFTC, the Secretary of
the Treasury, the FTC, and other Federal and state agencies,"' as well as
with each agency that is a member of the Financial Literacy and Education
100. See id. § 4601-02 (providing for transfer of consumer financial protection
functions to CFPA and setting "designated transfer date" as 180 days after passage
of final legislation).
101. See id. § 4103.
102. See id. § 4103(b).
103. See id. § 4103(d) (1).
104. Id. § 4103(b) (1) (B).
105. See id. § 4103(b) (3) (E).
106. See id. § 4103(c).
107. See id. § 4104(c).
108. See id. § 4101(d).
109. See id. § 4104(b).
110. See id. § 4107.
111. See id. § 4108(a).
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Commission. 1 12 The CFPA must make reports to Congress' 13 and be au-
dited by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). 11 4
Not only does H.R. 4173 provide direction regarding governing struc-
ture, it also provides extensive detail about internal organization for the
CFPA. The Director or the Commission is to appoint an Ombudsman to
advise consumers who may have a claim against a federal agency involving
consumer financial products, to provide information for consumers and
agencies, and to assist small institutions with compliance obligations.1 15
The CFPA must have a Research Division, a Community Affairs Division
concerned with underserved communities, a Consumer Complaints Divi-
sion, a Consumer Financial Education Division,e16 an Office of Financial
Protection for Older Americans,' 1 7 and an Office of Fair Lending and
Equal Opportunity.' 1 8 The CFPA must have a single toll-free telephone
number for consumer complaints and inquiries, from which the agency
may route appropriate calls to State and Federal financial institution regu-
latory agencies in addition to handling matters in house.11 9 The CFPA
must establish a public interagency Web site to receive and direct con-
sumer complaints.
With all the strings attached to the CFPA's authority to assure con-
sumer financial protection, one cannot help but recall Lemuel Gulliver
tied down by Lilliputians.120 In addition, one recalls the lobbyist's creed:
'Tis better to amend a problem bill into ineffectuality than to incur public
wrath by direct opposition.' 2 '
F. How Will the New Consumer Financial Protection Agency Be Staffed?
Each of the existing federal bank regulatory agencies will transfer its
current consumer protection functions and personnel to the CFPA.122
This assures expertise and minimizes start-up time for the new agency.
The greatly expanded jurisdiction over new entities, products, and services
will, however, require the new agency to recognize and allocate staff re-
sources among at least three models for regulation. I describe these as:
(1) "examination-driven" regulation, which is highly staff intensive because it
is based on periodically scheduled on-site visitation; (2) "complaint-driven"
112. See id. § 4108(b).
113. See id. § 4109 (requiring reports to President and Congress at each regu-
lar session of Congress); see also id. § 4110 (requiring GAO study of effect of CFPA
regulations on small businesses, with report to Congress).
114. See id. § 4113.
115. See id. § 4106 (a) (4).
116. See id. § 4106(c).
117. See id. § 4106(f).
118. See id. § 4106(g).
119. See id. § 4104(d).
120. SeeJONATHAN Swirr, GuLUVER's TRAVELs (1726).
121. Unfortunately, the author credits only personal experience.
122. See H.R. 4173, § 4601, et seq. The "designated transfer date" is to be 108
days after enactment of the legislation. See id. § 4602.
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regulation, which is less staff intensive and less comprehensive because it
calls for regulatory attention only when triggered by a certain level of con-
sumer complaints; and (3) "report-driven" regulation, which is like the cur-
rent review of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data by the
Federal Reserve Board that analyzes information required to be submitted
and produces a report lagging real time by almost two years.
Before the new agency gets up and running, it would be advisable to
review the start-up experiences of at least two other recent examples of
new agencies that consolidated and expanded on the mission of existing
agencies: The Resolution Trust Company (RTC), created in response to
the savings-and-loan meltdown in the 1980s and early 1990s, 1 2 3 and the
Public Accounting Oversight Board, created in response to the Enron/
Arthur Andersen accounting scandal. 124
G. What Funding Structure Is Optimal?
The Obama Administration's original plan outlined in the White Pa-
per calls for the CFPA to be "independent" of the industries it regulates.
As background, the existing federal banking agencies are funded, not
through taxpayer monies but through charter fees and assessments raised
from the entities they regulate. This provides a perverse incentive for
agencies to compete with each other to provide the most favorable, least
restrictive regulation to increase the number and size of institutions they
regulate. "Captive" regulators are incented to market their charters as a
way to escape consumer protection statutes.
H.R. 4173 calls for the agency to be funded: (1) through an annual
transfer of funds from the Federal Reserve equal to ten percent of the
Federal Reserve System's total system expenses;125 (2) through fees, based
on size, complexity of risk, and compliance record,1 26 assessed by the
123. See Learning from the Past: Lessons from the Banking Crises of the Twentieth
Century, Hearing before the Congressional Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. (2009) (state-
ment of David C. Cooke, Former Executive Director, Resolution Trust Company),
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/testimony-031909cooke.pdf.
124. The PCAOB was "created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to oversee
the auditors of public companies in order to protect investors and the public inter-
est by promoting informative, fair, and independent audit reports." See About the
PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2010). Al-
though the PCAOB is a private sector, non-profit corporation, the similarity of its
mission-to protect public interests and promote confidence in a key component
of the sound operation of U.S. financial markets-makes it a good source of expe-
riential learning regarding agency start-up successful strategies and potential
pitfalls.
125. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 4111(a) (2009).
126. See id. (noting that legislation contains complex limitations on fees and
assessments, as well as requirements to coordinate funding with existing agencies
during initial transition period).
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CFPA on entities regulated by the CFPA;1 2 7 and (3) in the start-up years,
2010 through 2014, Congress would appropriate $200,000,000 per year to
the CFPA.128 The Treasury Department would hold CFPA funds in two
separate accounts: The Consumer Financial Protection Agency Depository
Institution Fund129 and the Consumer Financial Protection Agency
Nondepository Institution Fund. 130 Funds from assessments levied on ei-
ther depository or nondepository institutions are to be deposited into the
appropriate fund and not commingled.13 1 Costs and expenses of operat-
ing the CFPA, including personnel, administrative, and other overhead
expenses, must be allocated to the appropriate fund and strictly accounted
for, although the CFPA may use the same facilities and resources in super-
vising and regulating depository and nondepository institutions. 3 2
This mix of funding is designed to insulate the CFPA from "regulatory
capture," which can occur when an agency is funded solely from its regu-
lated constituents. While equitable arguments can be made that one seg-
ment of regulated entities should not be taxed for supervision of another
segment, it is readily apparent that splitting the CFPA funds into "deposi-
tory institution" and "nondepository institution" will engender future turf
wars. On its face, such a complex funding system appears unworkable.
H. Should Financial Institutions Be Required to Offer "Plain Vanilla"
Financial Products?
A key component of the original proposal for a consumer financial
protection agency was a requirement that lenders offer "plain vanilla"
products that are simple, straightforward, clearly understandable to con-
sumers, capable of being easily compared with other products to obtain
the best deal, and less risky for consumers.' 3 3 The idea was that borrowers
would be offered "plain vanilla" thirty-year fixed mortgages first, and could
"opt in" to more complicated financial products after being advised of the
risks. 13 4 Michael Barr, Treasury Department Assistant Secretary for Finan-
cial Institutions, explains that "the 'plain-vanilla' financial products have
127. See id. § 4111(b). However, no examination fees are to be assessed
against small banks and credit unions that will not be examined by the CFPA, but
by their primary federal regulator. See id. § 4111(b) (3) (B) (ii).
128. See id. § 4111(c).
129. See id. § 4111(d).
130. See id. § 4111(e).
131. See id. § 4111(f).
132. See id.
133. See Posting of Elizabeth Warren to Consumer Reports' MoneyBlog,
http://blogs.consumerreports.org/money/2009/08/consumer-reports-consumer-
financial-protection-agency-elizabeth-warren-interview-cfpa-plain-vanilla-mortgage-
banks-lenders-fi.html (Aug. 17, 2009) (explaining "plain vanilla" financial products
provisions of original CFPA legislation).
134. See Amy Hoak, Making Mortgages More "Vanilla," BosrON HERALD, Sept.
11, 2009, http://www.responsiblelending.org/tools-resources/headlines/making-
mortgages-more-vanilla.html.
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their roots in behavioral economics and psychology. It isn't enough to
provide consumers with more disclosure and more information, since peo-
ple often get easily overwhelmed and make mistakes."135 Financial institu-
tions would be able to continue offering more complex financial products
to sophisticated customers.' 3 6
The "plain vanilla" requirement was included in H.R. 3126 as origi-
nally filed in the House,13 7 but it quickly met objections from the banking
industry that "plain vanilla" mortgages would cut into profitably and make
departing from the "plain vanilla" menu more risky for financial institu-
tions.1 38 It may be hard to understand why this was a persuasive argument
in light of the damage done by complicated "teaser rate" Adjustable Rate
Mortgages (ARMs); nevertheless, the "plain vanilla" products requirement
was one of the first provisions of the legislation to be negotiated away.13 9
H.R. 4173, as passed by the House, contains an express provision that the
CFPA will have no authority to require the offering of financial products
or services.14 0
I. Will a New Consumer Financial Protection Agency Result in More
Government Regulation, Stifle "Innovation, " and Increase
the Cost of Financial Products and Services?
Opponents of financial reform almost always begin with an argument
that more government regulation will increase regulatory burden on fi-
nancial institutions, stifle innovation, and increase the cost of financial
products and services-which will ultimately be borne by consumers.14 1
This argument has several component parts that deserve response. First, a
key cause of the financial crisis was lack of regulation (not excessive regu-
lation) and lack of government oversight in many parts of the mortgage
lending market. Second, "innovation" for its own sake is not necessarily
good. Columbia Business School Professor Stiglitz, winner of the 2001
Nobel Prize in Economics for work relating to financial markets and in-
centives, has addressed this argument succinctly:
135. Jane J. Kim, Plain-Vanilla Financing Could Melt Bank Profits, WALL ST. J.,
June 29, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124597610438257573.html.
136. See id. (quoting Joseph Longino as saying that, "You'd see the plain-va-
nilla 'Good Housekeeping Federal Seal of Approval' on products for lower-income
consumers ... and more innovative products offered to wealthier, sophisticated
consumers").
137. See H.R. 3126, § 136.
138. See Kim, supra note 135.
139. See Anne Flaherty, Congress Wary of "Plain Vanilla" Bank Proposal,
ABCNEWS/MONEY, Sept. 22, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=
8638900.
140. See H.R. 4173, § 4311.
141. See Perspectives on the Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Hearings Before
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Edward Yingling,
President and CEO, American Bankers Association), http://www.aba.com/NR/
rdonlyres/222CE44-577A-11D5-AB84-00508B95258D/62711/Sept30EdYingling
HFSC.pdf.
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Our financial markets not only mismanaged risk-and created
products that increased the risk faced by others-but they also
failed to create financial products that would help ordinary
Americans face the important risks that they confronted, such as
the risks of home ownership or the risks of inflation. Indeed, I
am in total agreement with Paul Volcker [Chairman of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board from 1979-1987]-it is hard to find evidence
of any real growth associated with the so-called innovations,
though it is easy to see the link between those innovations and
the disaster that confronted our economy. 142
Third, any argument that continued lack of centralized, focused consumer
financial protection regulation and enforcement will result in increased
costs to consumers is disingenuous. How can we forget the costs to con-
sumers and the U.S. economy resulting from the subprime mortgage "in-
novations?" Professor Warren identifies and counters three myths about
the Consumer Financial Product Agency: (1) that it will limit consumer
choice and hinder innovation; (2) that it will add another layer of regula-
tion and increase regulatory burden; and (3) that prudential and con-
sumer regulation cannot be separated.1 4 3
J. Can States Retain Concurrent Authority Over Consumer Financial
Protection, and If So, What is the Appropriate Measure of Federal
Preemption in the Financial Institutions Arena?
The Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act, as it now stands, de-
votes an entire subtitle to "Preservation of State Law,"1 44 explicitly provid-
ing that State law is not preempted "except to the extent that such statute,
regulation, order, or interpretation is inconsistent with the provisions of
this title and then only to the extent of the inconsistency."' 4 5 The pur-
pose and effect of this language is to reject and remove legal authority for
claims of "field preemption" with regard to consumer protection and fed-
erally chartered financial institutions. Under this legislation, if passed,
State consumer protection law would be examined on a case by case basis
for "conflict preemption."1 46
142. Compensation in the Financial Industry: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Fin.
Sews., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Dr. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia
University), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs-dem/stiglitz.
pdf.
143. See Warren, supra note 38.
144. See H.R. 4173, § 4401.
145. Id. § 4401 (a).
146. See Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982)
(identifying three categories of federal preemption of state law: express preemp-
tion, conflict preemption, and field preemption). Because this Congressional
change in the type of preemption from "field" to "conflict" would give States dra-
matically more ability to adopt and enforce their own consumer financial protec-
tion laws, it is important to reexamine the Supreme Court's definitions. First, the
de la Cuesta opinion explains that the basis for the federal preemption doctrine is
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The Act goes on to provide that State law is not inconsistent with the
provisions of this law if the State statute, regulation, order, or interpreta-
tion affords consumers greater protection. 147 This federal consumer pro-
tection law would establish a floor, a basic level of required consumer
protection, but permit the States to adopt stricter standards.14 8
With the language of H.R. 4173, § 4401, Congress would directly ad-
dress federal agency assertions of preemption that blocked State con-
sumer protection efforts even as predatory lending abuses escalated,
contributing to the "subprime mortgage meltdown." Congress would ex-
pressly roll back a tide of agency interpretations and regulations, together
with lower court opinions upholding them-and nullify parts of two re-
cent U.S. Supreme Court decisions:' 4 9 Watters v. Wachoviao50 and Cuomo v.
Clearing House Ass'n.15 1 The development of federal preemption in the
financial institutions arena leading up to the House-passed legislation has
been extensively analyzed;' 5 2 therefore, this commentary is limited to not-
ing the effect of potential new statutory language.
Congressional testimony from consumer advocates, state financial in-
stitution regulators, and state attorneys general demonstrates support to
end the blanket preemption that allowed federally chartered financial in-
stitutions and their affiliates to adopt the shield of federal preemption and
escape state consumer protection laws.' 5 3 Congressional testimony from
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, giving rise to express preemption
when "Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language." Id. at 153
(quotingJones v. Roth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). Conflict preemption,
a second category in which preemption is implied rather than expressed, exists in
two situations. Id. One is when "compliance with both state and federal regula-
tions is a physical impossibility." Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)). Another is when state law "stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). Finally, field
preemption, the broadest of the three categories, exists when "the scheme of federal
regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it." Id. at 152 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
147. See H.R. 4173, § 4401 (a) (2).
148. See generally, Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902,
918 (2009) (discussing other federal statutes that establish "floor" and allow states
to impose stricter standards).
149. For a discussion of the impact of the congressional language, see supra
notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
150. 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
151. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
152. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets
Upstream, 26 YALEJ. REr. 143, 163-89 (2009) (providing chronology of legal devel-
opments in federal preemption for financial institutions); Michael C. Tomkies,
Ralph T. Wutscher, David L. Beam & Elizabeth L. Anstaett, Defining the Scope of
Federal Preemption: State Fann, Exclusive Agents, and Other Emerging Issues, 64 Bus.
LAw. 605 (2009) (outlining development and scope of federal preemption in fi-
nancial institutions arena up to the passage of H.R. 4173).
153. For a discussion of various opponents to blanket preemption, see supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
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federal regulatory agencies15 4 and the financial services industry15 5 shows
opposition to these limitations on federal preemption.
III. POLITICAL REALITIES AND THE CITIZENS UNITED CASE: CONCLUSIONS
AND PROGNOSTICATIONS ABOUT THE CFPA
The immediate fate of the CFPA and financial regulatory reform as a
whole currently rests in the hands of the U.S. Senate.1 5 6 News bulletins
throughout early spring 2010 have carried all the thrill and uncertainty of
a roller coaster ride:
* January 15, 2010: Consumer Protection Agency in Doubt,1 5 7
* January 16, 2010: Senator Dodd May Drop Push for Consumer Financial
Protection Agency;' 5 8
* February 5, 2010: Talks with G.O.P. on Financial Bill at "Impasse,"
Dodd Says'5 9
* February 9, 2010: Business Owners Say Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Would Protect Businesses and Economy;' 60 and
* February 25, 2010: "[T]he fate of a consumer financial protection
entity remains a key sticking point in the Senate negotiations,
sharply dividing Republicans and Democrats."1 61
Partisanship plays a critical part in this debate. No House Republi-
cans voted for H.R. 4173. Money plays another major role. According to
President Obama, financial institutions spent more than $300,000,000 in
2009 lobbying for their positions on financial regulatory reform. 162
154. For an overview of Congressional testimony from federal regulatory
agencies, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
155. For a summary of testimony from the financial industry, see supra note
36 and accompanying text.
156. A political axiom: When the legislature's in session, lock up your chil-
dren and dogs. Anything can happen.
157. See Damian Paletta, Consumer Protection Agency in Doubt, WALL ST. J., Jan.
15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704363504575003360
632239020.html.
158. See Brady Dennis & Binyamin Appelbaum, Sen. Dodd May Drop Push for
Consumer Financial Protection Agency, WASH. PosT, Jan. 16, 2010, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/15/AR2010011504054.
html.
159. See Sewell Chan, Talks with G.O.P. on Financial Bill at 'Impasse,'Dodd Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/business/06
regulate.html.
160. Press Release, Main Street Alliance, Business Owners Say Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Agency Would Protect Business and Economy (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://mainstreetalliance.org/wordpress/national/1946/.
161. Jim Kuhnhenn, Federal Reserve Comes in from Senate Deep Freeze, FORBES,
Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2010/02/25/general-us-
financial-overhaul_7388914.html.
162. See President Barack Obama, Weekly Address (Dec. 12, 2009), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-applauds-
important-step-forward-financial-reform.
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In the midst of all the congressional drama comes a Supreme Court
decision that will also impact the outcome of the proposed CFPA and fi-
nancial regulatory reform legislation. On January 21, 2010, the U.S. Su-
preme Court issued its opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission.'6 3 Acting as the perennial swing-vote, Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy wrote the majority opinion. The five-four decision eliminated key
federal campaign finance restrictions-and consequently overturned state
restrictions that have prohibited corporations and unions from paying for
ads that support or oppose a particular candidate.16 4 With mid-term elec-
tions slated for Fall 2010, members of Congress will be looking to their
home constituencies as well as major interest groups and the campaign
money marshaled to spend on issues of financial regulatory reform.
In the final analysis, having considered pros and cons for the princi-
pal points of logical contention over whether Congress should establish an
independent consumer financial protection agency, we must return to
practicalities: campaign contributions, partisanship, and political will.
163. See 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also Adam Liptak, justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate
Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/
us/politics/22scotus.html.
164. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882.
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